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On 21 January 2015, Internet users in China who were trying to ac-cess blocked websites and smartphone apps encountered difficul-ties connecting to virtual private networks (VPNs), a popular
circumvention tool for bypassing censorship in a country where government
control of online space has been notorious. Astrill, StrongVPN and Golden
Frog, three major providers of commercial VPN services that reported serv-
ice disruptions, all blamed the interference on the Chinese cyberspace au-
thorities. The attack, they claimed, was carried out with a level of
sophistication unseen before. (1)
Having the world’s largest online population with more than 600 million
Internet users, China has also been known for its highly restrictive Internet
control, which forms an integral part of the government’s extensive over-
sight of information flow, ranging from media to culture. A recent Freedom
House report detailed the government’s sophisticated techniques to impose
information control, including strategic control over key information nodes,
censorship outsourcing, stronger Party leadership, ideological re-emphasis,
and a crackdown on social media. (2) But so far, the Chinese authorities have
kept their hands off the use of VPNs, which leaves a small window for
China’s Internet users – from ordinary surfers to privileged elites – to enjoy
an unfettered Internet for entertainment and professional uses. The clamp-
down on VPNs hence suggests the government’s new thinking with respect
to circumvention around the censors, or what is known as the Great Firewall
(fanghuoqiang 防火墙). What explains the change? And why such timing?
State media later said that the VPN block was due to an upgrade of the
Great Firewall, (3) and senior state officials, for the first time, even acknowl-
edged responsibility. According to Wen Ku, director of telecom development
at the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), the VPN
block was intended to ensure the healthy and lawful development of the
Internet. (4) Although VPN providers managed to recover their services by
reconfiguring their settings to outwit the Great Firewall, it appeared that
Chinese cyberspace authorities are serious and open about clamping down
on circumvention tools, and that they are refining their technology to shut
off China's Internet and turn it into an Intranet if necessary. The block also
appeared as the latest episode in a series of cyber-policing measures over
the past few months, including the blocking of Google and Gmail and de-
liberate attacks on foreign sites such as Microsoft, Yahoo, and Apple. While
these measures reflect the continuation of China’s long-standing policy to
increase oversight on the Internet, they further suggest that the authorities
are taking steps to control segments in cyberspace that cannot be readily
monitored – channels that were once allowed to leave an open door for In-
ternet users to access information from foreign sources. 
This article begins by discussing possible reasons behind the VPN block and
linking it to the institutional expansion of the cyberspace authorities, which
has resulted in a series of measures to tighten up cybersecurity. It argues that
these measures reflect two main strategies: content control and technological
self-sufficiency. These two strategies are key building blocks in China’s con-
ception of cybersecurity, a notion defined by Chinese officials as technologies
and processes designed to protect against Internet-based threats to a wide
range of domains, including political and ideological integrity, data, technol-
ogy, applications, businesses, and communication channels. (5) These strategies
are not only aimed at maintaining regime survival and protecting national
security, but are also intended to nurture the domestic economy – particularly
the technology industry. The increasingly restrictive Internet policies suggest
that China is keen to pursue cybersecurity as a national priority, and is doing
so regardless of the serious consequences it might entail. 
The VPN block: Why now?
The timing of the VPN block was puzzling, given the fact that the Chinese
authorities had long tolerated VPN use despite their onerous control over
the Internet. In an online discussion initiated by ChinaFile, George Chen, a
Hong Kong-based journalist, raised the question and considered the VPN
ban as part of China’s ongoing ideological crusade against Western values,
directed by President Xi Jinping, from universities to cyberspace. (6) The ide-
ology war began with the circulation of Document No. 9 around April 2013,
which warned against seven perils including “Western constitutional democ-
racy” and “universal values,” (7) followed by a recent but unpublished direc-
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tive, Document No. 30, which allegedly “demands cleansing Western-in-
spired liberal ideas from universities and other cultural institutions.” (8) The
message of the latter text was echoed in a new directive published by the
central government in January 2015, which called for the strengthening of
propaganda and ideological work in higher education. (9) After its circulation,
education minister Yuan Guiren urged universities to shun textbooks that
promote Western values, a move widely seen as a step up to imposing
stricter political discipline and control in China’s education system. 
In the same discussion, Charlie Smith, a co-founder of GreatFire.org and
FreeWeibo.com, points to something more. He contended that the ban was
not just a reflection of the Party’s growing repugnance toward foreign val-
ues, but also a logical step in the recent ramp-up of cybersecurity and a
further move to establish the concept of “cyber-sovereignty” (wangluo
zhuquan 网络主权), a principle stipulating that national governments have
the right to supervise, regulate, and censor online information within their
own borders. (10) The concept has become China’s foundational policy in pro-
moting the need of national information borders on the diplomatic front,
especially in the wake of Edward Snowden’s revelations about U.S. cyber-
espionage on foreign countries, including China. (11) According to government
rhetoric, “cyber-sovereignty” and “cybersecurity” are closely-related con-
cepts in China’s Internet policy: while “cyber-sovereignty” serves as a diplo-
matic principle on the global arena, “cybersecurity” concerns the safety of
domestic cyberspace. (12) Despite their different orientations, both concepts
share the same goal: the need for a state-centric approach to monitoring
cyberspace. This article will focus on “cybersecurity” and its domestic im-
plications. 
The rising power of cyberspace authorities
The increasingly restrictive cybersecurity measures ought to be first ex-
plained from an institutional perspective. Over the past few years, China’s
cyberspace authorities have undergone rapid expansion and have signifi-
cantly increased their powers. In December 2013, the Politburo established
the Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs (zhongyang wangluo an-
quan he xinxihua lingdao xiaozu 中央网络安全和信息化领导小组), led di-
rectly by President Xi Jinping and tasked with the drafting of “national
strategies, development plans, and major policies.” The group established
an office to implement its tasks, named as the Office of the Central Leading
Group for Cyberspace Affairs, more commonly known as Cyberspace Ad-
ministration of China (CAC) (wangxinban 网信办). The office became a new
cyberspace authority replacing the State Internet Information Office (SIIO),
an entity established by the State Council in May 2011 to operate under
the State Council Information Office (SCIO) as an Internet regulatory body. 
The replacement of the SIIO by the CAC resulted in an independent and
consolidated cyberspace authority with significantly expanded powers, since
it separated the Internet regulatory body from the State Council and led to
the merging of entities with different organisational pedigrees. As a State
Council agency, the SIIO was a government body mainly responsible for
promulgating policies to lower-ranking ministries. (13) The newly established
leading group, on the other hand, is a more powerful authority that reports
directly to the Politburo, with an importance on par with other leading
groups such as the one on deepening reform and national security, also led
by President Xi himself. Given its ties to the central leadership, the CAC is
able to involve itself in high-level policy-making and coordinate implemen-
tation across China’s political bureaucracy, “[bringing] control over a broad
policy area to a single conference table.” (14) According to Wang Yukai, a
member of the Advisory Committee for State Information, this organisa-
tional arrangement carries strategic importance. As cyberspace affairs in-
volve matters that fall under the scope and interests of different
government departments, the Internet regulatory body requires more power
to strike down barriers between different power-holders in the Communist
Party, government, and military to enable effective policy implementation.
With the founding of the CAC, the previously fragmented Internet gover-
nance landscape can now be consolidated under one regulatory agency.
Subsequently, the consolidation of power was followed by its institutional
expansion at the local level. As of July 2014, ten provinces had established
provincial leading groups on cyberspace affairs. Mega cities such as Beijing
have also established their own cybersecurity committees. (15)
With their expansion both at the central and local level, the cyberspace
authorities have become an increasingly influential stakeholder in China’s
political scene. Since the establishment of the CAC, Minister Lu Wei has
gained wide exposure in the media. Dubbed “China’s web doorkeeper,” (16)
Lu has met with numerous foreign diplomats, government ministers, and
corporate leaders, (17) has toured around the continents, paid visits to foreign
tech giants such as Facebook, Apple, and Amazon, (18) and has addressed au-
diences from decision-makers to university students, with a mission to pro-
mote the concept of “cyber-sovereignty” and China’s involvement in global
Internet governance. On the other hand, the CAC supported two locally-
held Internet conferences in 2014: first was the China-ASEAN Cyberspace
forum in Nanning, Guangxi, in September, and then came the World Internet
Conference in Wuzhen, a town in Zhejiang, in November – both were the
first of their kind. (19) The second World Internet Conference is scheduled to
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be held again in Wuzhen in October 2015. In December 2014, the CAC
launched its official website to release news and regulations about cyber-
space affairs, an apparent move to acquire its own voice. (20)
Tightening content control under the CAC
But more importantly, the Internet watchdog has significantly enlarged
the scope of Internet oversight. It has initiated a number of “strike-hard
campaigns” on China’s cyberspace, including a crackdown on Big V mi-
crobloggers, or influential accounts in the Chinese social media, (21) and a
nationwide campaign to clean up online porn and rumours. (22) Under the
latter campaign, the watchdog has shut down 1.8 million accounts in social
networking platforms and instant messaging services (23) as well as hundreds
of websites for violations ranging from pornography to “publishing political
news without a permit.” (24) It has even threatened to close down Internet
news service Sina Corp., the owner of China’s biggest microblogging site,
Sina Weibo, “if it fails to improve censorship of illegal content”. (25) In Feb-
ruary 2015, the watchdog announced new guidelines to enforce real-name
registration (shimingzhi 实名制), which requires Internet users to register
public accounts with their real names while banning accounts that imper-
sonate people or organisations. (26) According to the CAC, the use of real on-
line identities helps “ensure a safer online environment” and prevents “the
spreading of rumours and information relating to terrorism, pornography
and violence on the Internet,” and will be extended from instant messaging
tools (such as WeChat and QQ) to forums and micro-blogging platforms. (27)
Previously, China has made repeated attempts to enforce real-name reg-
istration, such as on the micro-blogging platform Weibo, which achieved
some success by driving users away from the platform (while diverting them
to instant messaging tools such as WeChat). While the latest regulation
only applies to the public accounts on instant messaging tools, it appears
to be a serious attempt to extend real-name registration more comprehen-
sively across China’s Internet outlets. Experts warned that this could dis-
courage outspoken individuals from setting up public accounts, effectively
eradicating space for critical, sarcastic, or literary online content. (28) As Bill
Bishop, editor of the influential China newsletter Sinocism, remarked, “The
real real-name registration [is] clearly coming.” (29) Yet others have ques-
tioned the effectiveness of Internet real-name registration, pointing to the
fact that China's social media market is too fragmented to enforce the re-
strictions and that netizens are mobile enough to migrate to alternative
platforms. (30) However, if real-name registration is enforced systematically
on all platforms, netizens might ultimately run out of alternates to migrate
to. The cyberspace authorities saw this as a way to eradicate online rumours
and critics that might pose threats to Party survival. But an airtight control
on information might after all create a bigger market for unofficial opinions
and rumours, which could well emerge in alternative forms. 
While these Internet campaigns articulated China’s intent to ramp up con-
tent control, Internet watchers suspected that the authorities launched nu-
merous attacks on foreign websites for similar purposes. For example,
GreatFire.org, a group that monitors online censorship in China, has accused
the cyberspace authorities of staging man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks on
Google, Yahoo, Microsoft Outlook, Apple’s iCloud, and even HSBC’s corporate
banking website. A man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack is a malicious Internet
assault that “hijacks an online connection to monitor and sometimes control
communications made through that channel.” (31) In August 2014, Internet
users in China trying to access Google via CERNET, China’s education net-
work, which still allowed access to the website after the authorities com-
pletely blocked it on commercial networks since 4 June 2014, were unable
to do so anymore due to a suspected MITM attack. (32) A similar attack was
launched in October on Apple’s iCloud, coinciding with the launch of the
new iPhone 6 in China, in which hackers attempted to gain access to user-
names and passwords on the cloud service, where Apple users store their
messages, contacts, and photos. (33) In November, Chinese Internet users re-
ported problems connecting to HSBC’s corporate banking portal, which ap-
peared to have been blocked by the cyberspace authorities because it uses
an Akamai domain that provides encrypted login for clients. GreatFire.org
believed the authorities wanted to block access to mirror websites that the
censorship watchdog hosts with Akamai. “The authorities have decided that
they are better served by plugging a small leak than allowing commerce to
thrive,” GreatFire.org wrote in a post. In December, the cyberspace authorities
appeared to have completely blocked Gmail, which users had previously still
been able to access via third-party email services such as Apple Mail or Mi-
crosoft Outlook despite an earlier block on Gmail’s website. This resulted in
a dramatic plunge in Google traffic in China ever since. (34) After Google, the
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latest victim was Microsoft’s Outlook, whose users are now unable to send
and receive messages using SMTP and IMAP email protocols. (35) All the at-
tacks appeared to be connected to the CAC, GreatFire.org claimed, and they
“[signal] that the Chinese authorities are intent on further cracking down on
communication methods that they cannot readily monitor.” (36)
In light of these intensifying efforts on content control, it is not surprising
that cyberspace authorities have taken a further step to disrupt VPN serv-
ices. The rising power and expanding reach of the cyberspace authorities
appear to be the key reason accounting for the latest efforts to squeeze out
the remaining freedom on the Chinese Internet. Meanwhile, Xiao Qiang, a
U.S.-based China media observer, supplemented the view with a techno-
logical dimension, situating the issue against the long-standing competition
between China’s Great Firewall and the circumvention tools. Quoting a
Global Times interview with Fang Binxing, who is widely regarded as the
“father of the Great Firewall,” Xiao described the competition between the
GFW and VPNs as a “ceaseless war,” with the GFW long lagging behind
VPNs. He suggested that the VPN block means that the GFW is gaining the
upper hand in this ceaseless war. (37) It must be noted, however, that not all
VPNs were blocked – only the commercial ones were targeted. In fact, many
institutional VPNs and the less popular ones are still working. (38) China’s of-
ficial policy is not to ban VPNs altogether, but to require domestic or foreign
companies running a VPN business in China to register with the Ministry of
Industry and Information Technology. (39) The firewall upgrade to block some
of the VPNs was justified by state media as a move to enforce Chinese
laws. (40) This means that China may still intend to maintain a window al-
lowing circumvention around the censors, but that such a window must be
monitored by the authorities. As Xiao pointed out, VPNs still play a crucial
role in shaping the unofficial media environment inside China. They allow
sensitive information leaked by “information brokers” to be brought back
inside the Great Firewall, an instrument likely used by power-holders to
spread rumours about their political enemies and to drive political bickering.
In light of its potential value, it does not seem likely that China will com-
pletely ban the use of circumvention tools. 
More recent reports suggested that the Great Firewall could further be
turned into an offensive weapon by diverting Internet traffic that flows
through it to overload targeted websites. In March 2015, Github, an Amer-
ican website that acts as a library of code for programmers and hosts pages
that enable users to view sites blocked in China, suffered from a distributed
denial of service (DDoS) attack by diverting traffic from China’s own Inter-
net giant Baidu, intending to remove two pages on Github, one with code
from GreatFire.org and another that hosts links to mirror sites of the Chinese
version of The New York Times, whose website was banned in China since
2012. (41) The attack followed a March 16 report on The Wall Street Journal
that described the ways anti-censorship groups use cloud servers, run by
companies such as Amazon.com, Microsoft Corp. and Akamai Technologies
to get around China’s Great Firewall. A report published by the University
of Toronto’s Citizen Lab called this “new weapon” the Great Cannon, which
was not just an extension of the Great Firewall, but “a distinct attack tool
that hijacks traffic to (or presumably from) individual IP addresses, and can
arbitrarily replace unencrypted content as a man-in-the-middle”. Accord-
ingly, the Great Cannon possesses the ability to “exploit by IP address”,
which allows it to launch cyberattacks on “targeted individuals who com-
municates with any Chinese server not employing cryptographic protec-
tions”. (42) The latest attack suggests that China’s Internet authorities not
only have the ability to block content from outside, but also the capability
to take the offensive on both websites and individuals. In addition, the in-
volvement of Baidu in the attack further suggests that Chinese authorities
are willing to pursue cybersecurity at the expense of fostering development
of the tech and business sector. 
Technological self-sufficiency
China’s cybersecurity concerns are not limited to just the flow of infor-
mation, but further extend to the technological landscape, where the gov-
ernment has become increasingly cautious against foreign technology,
ranging from software to computer chips. The concern became particularly
heightened in light of the Snowden revelations. A recent report published
by Kaspersky Lab, a Russian cybersecurity firm, served as a fresh reminder
of the importance of technological safety in cyberspace. It said that the
United States has found a way to permanently embed surveillance and sab-
otage tools in computers and networks located in countries such as Iran,
Russia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and China. According to the report, the spy-
ware is linked to Stuxnet, a computer worm that disabled about 1,000 cen-
trifuges in Iran’s nuclear enrichment program, under a project run jointly by
Israel and the United States. (43)
In light of the cybersecurity concerns in the technological realm, the Chinese
government is rushing to introduce security requirements in the commercial
sector. One example was a new restriction for technology vendors of China’s
banking sector. The restriction, set out in a 22-page document approved in
December 2014, requires companies that sell computer equipment to Chinese
banks to “turn over secret source code, submit to invasive audits and build
so-called back doors into hardware and software.” (44) The use of backdoors
has been identified by China as one of the key sources of cyber-attacks by
the United States. According to the SIIO, a Chinese security team found that
2,016 IP addresses in the U.S. had implanted backdoors in 1,754 Chinese web-
sites, involving 57,000 backdoor attacks. (45) Hence, protection against back-
doors is deemed sorely necessary in strategic sectors such as banking, which
holds sensitive financial information of the state. The same reason had been
used by the United States to prevent Huawei, a major Chinese maker of com-
puter servers and cell phones, from entering the U.S. market. 
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Current affairs
A draft counterterrorism law, which is expected to be approved within
months, goes a step further by extending the requirement to more firms. It
requires all technology companies to hand over encryption keys and source
codes and also to install security “backdoors,” which would mean that the
Chinese government will know how their products work, making them vul-
nerable to hacking. (46) While some foreign tech companies, such as Apple Inc.,
have reportedly agreed to the requirement of security inspections, (47) others
have objected to the new policies and complained that they amounted to
protectionism in a letter sent to the cybersecurity leading group led by Pres-
ident Xi. (48) The rules were further criticised by Human Rights Watch as “en-
forcing a system of complete, permanent digital surveillance.” (49) So far, China
has showed no intention of watering down the rules. If they are eventually
passed by the legislature without significant revision, it will be a stark indica-
tion that Beijing will not compromise cybersecurity for foreign technology. 
Meanwhile, the growing caution against foreign technology is shaping a
new wave of technological development in China. In the component indus-
try, for example, cybersecurity concerns have become an impetus for the
Chinese government to reduce reliance on foreign chips and encourage the
development of domestic chips, owing to their importance in controlling
key functions of smartphones, televisions, computers, and networking
equipment, and their perceived vulnerabilities to eavesdropping if they are
manufactured by foreign firms. (50) As Wu Hequan, an expert at the Chinese
Academy of Engineering, argued in his research report posted on People’s
Daily, cybersecurity must be safeguarded through developing solid home-
grown technology, primarily computer chips. (51) State Council expert Wang
Yukai put it in similar perspective: “[s]ecurity is actually a technological com-
petition in which China, lacking core technology, has lagged behind due to
excessive dependence on overseas equipment and information systems.” (52)
In light of the increasing strategic importance given to electronic compo-
nents, semiconductors, for example, have been named as a key strategic
sector for China since September 2013. (53)
The tendency to promote domestic tech players is further demonstrated
by a recently approved state procurement list, which has dropped a number
of leading foreign technology brands such as Apple Inc., along with U.S. net-
work equipment maker Cisco Systems Inc., security software firm McAfee,
and network and server software firm Citrix Systems. The number of foreign
tech brands fell by a third on the list, and less than half of those with secu-
rity-related products remained. Meanwhile, the almost two-fold increase in
procurement products came mostly from local makers. (54) The procurement
list followed the exclusion of Apple products, Microsoft’s Windows 8 oper-
ating system, and Symantec and Kaspersky antivirus products last year from
the state purchase directory. (55) The implications are consistent and clear:
local products offer more security guarantees; and by awarding contracts
to local makers, China in effect subsidises the domestic tech industry and
nurtures home-grown giants to become as competitive as their overseas
rivals. Although this raised suspicion of protectionism that might violate
World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules, Bien Perez, an SCMP technology re-
porter, said that the complex regulations will make it difficult for the U.S.
government and technology firms to take legal action against Beijing, as it
did not sign a plurilateral treaty on government procurements, despite a
commitment to do so. “As a result, China is able to remove any foreign
brands that the government doesn’t like from its state procurement lists
with little potential WTO blowback,” Perez argued. (56)
The dovetailing of security concerns with commercial interests has formed
a strong justification for censorship and cyber-protectionism. Most notably,
a Global Times op-ed attempted to praise Internet censorship by arguing
that China’s Great Firewall has given rise to the three domestic tech giants:
Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent (known as the BAT), and that it has not affected
its opening-up policy. The firewall only blocks certain overseas websites in
a targeted fashion, rather than isolating China’s Internet from the overseas
one, the column argued. (57) Without the Great Firewall, “China would be-
come the realm of Google China, Yahoo China, and Facebook China.” (58) In
a similar but less triumphant tone, MIIT official Wen Ku said that China’s
Internet companies should owe their successes to the “good policy envi-
ronment” created by the Chinese government, (59) or the top-down policy
support often regarded by Chinese businessmen and entrepreneurs as the
prerequisite for doing business in China. Both Global Times and Mr. Wen’s
words revealed that China’s Internet censorship is not a pure political or
national security concern; it has an equally significant economic dimension.
In addition, these two dimensions, political and economic, will become mu-
tually reinforcing. As these domestic giants rise up, they will develop their
own set of interests and become key stakeholders in China’s political
process. This has been demonstrated, for example, by Alibaba’s recent slam
on a Chinese state regulator against its criticism of the excess of counterfeit
goods on its e-commerce platform. (60) Although their ascent might help
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build up China’s domestic technology industry and its technological capa-
bility, it could create perverse incentives for increasing Internet
censorship. As beneficiaries of the Great Firewall, domestic giants will have
the interest to build up, rather than lower, the Great Firewall in order to
fend off competition. It creates the economic foundation that turns the
Firewall into a permanent structure, as opposed to a makeshift one that the
Global Times op-ed so anticipated. 
Conclusion
While it is typical (although not necessarily justifiable) for governments to
impose some form of censorships to safeguard national security and also to
impose some form of protectionist measures to nurture domestic industries,
China, as its recent policies have suggested, appears to be taking a militant
approach on both aspects, emphasising a state-centric and comprehensive
control on online information on the one hand, and a nationalist industrial
policy on the technology sector on the other. Although relatively successful,
both approaches are not without substantial costs. An increasingly sophisti-
cated system of information control not only further tramples upon the
human rights enshrined in China’s own Constitution, but also drains the
Party’s public support and dampens the country’s creativity and innovation,
the necessary ingredients for a more advanced economic development. A
New York Times report, for example, warned that the VPN ban had “provoked
a torrent of outrage among video artists, entrepreneurs and professors.” (61)
According to the report, these elites might not have the slightest intention
of overthrowing the Communist Party, but barring them from connecting to
banned foreign websites and apps such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Flickr,
Google, or Gmail might irritate them, in turn eroding popular support for the
Party. In addition, the newspaper argued that the block on VPNs might carry
a huge economic cost as it might stifle “the innovation and productivity
needed to revive the Chinese economy at a time of slowing growth.” (62)
In his SCMP column, George Chen compared China’s “closed-Internet” pol-
icy to the “closed-door” policy of the Qing Dynasty, suggesting that the im-
pact could be extensive. “Many mainland scholars are now limited to do
their research as they can rely mostly on domestic search engines and on-
line research tools where English-language information is limited. Students
also find it difficult to stay in touch with foreign universities or employers
after the blocking of Google's email service,” Chen wrote. (63) A China news
portal reported that the disruption (and later, the complete ban) of Gmail
is now affecting tens of thousands of Chinese students who rely on the
email provider to stay connected to their U.S. universities or apply to
them. (64) Another SCMP report suggested that the VPN block is preventing
foreigners and millions of Chinese from using Google-based business tools
while hurting small-and-medium-sized foreign companies that depended
on VPNs, as larger companies could afford direct links to overseas servers. (65)
On the other hand, cyber-protectionism in the tech landscape not only
drives out foreign tech enterprises, but also their technology, experience,
and know-how, which Chinese firms could learn from under collaboration.
Without competitive pressure from foreign technology, the extent of suc-
cess in building up its home-grown technological capabilities will now be
questionable. Worse still, the policy promotes a chauvinistic culture that
anything foreign would be harmful for China’s national security, which will
further erode the spirit of learning, innovation, and creativity. For now, the
golden days of reform and opening might be over. A closed-door policy with
an increasingly restrictive Internet now moves to the centre stage to be-
come part of the popular political catchword – the “new normal” (xinchang-
tai 新常态).
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